Topics GeographyHeadlinesInfrastructureKatrinaNeighborhoodsPeopleRecreation
|
It's a weak pun, but it expresses what most New Orleanians feel is at
the heart of the problems caused by Katrina. How could a multibillion
dollar hurricane protection system designed by the best and brightest
over a period of forty years fail so miserably?
At first the US Army Corps of Engineers said it was because the storm
was more intense than the Standard Project Storm they were authorized
to defend
against. Well this statement is wrong on so many levels it's just
impossible to
dissect. Read about the Six Floods to see what really happened. Over
time the Corps claimed it was unafraid of the truth. I would have been
happier if they said they were actively searching for the truth. As it
turns out they were.
The Corps commissioned the Interagency Performance Evaluation Task force
(IPET) to find out what happened. IPET reported in March, 2006 that the 17th
Street Canal levee failed because the water pushed the flood wall
backward (deflected) allowing water and pressure into the heart of the levee causing
the failure. They claimed the failure was unanticipated but Bob Bea, a
Berkley engineer and Betsy era New Orleanian, funded by the National Science Foundation held their
feet to the fire by surfacing a
1986 study by the Corps itself that showed the levees would fail in
just this way. Nobody at the Corps stepped up to explain why they
ignored that study. They later reported that London Avenue failed in much the same way.
Finally in April, 2006 they admitted they might have made a mistake. The Head
Engineer, Lt. Gen. Carl Strock said it was the design. "We have
now concluded we had problems with the
design of the structure. We had
hoped that wasn't the case [why?], but we recognize it is the
reality." And now what? Are
any changes being made? Does anybody care? Strock apparently did.
In August he asked the Secretary of the Army for permission to retire. In May, 2007 Lt. Gen. Robert Van Antwerp is poised to take his place.
In May, 2006 the Independent Levee Investigation Team (Berkeley and other
researchers under NSF grant) released their final draft report citing
numerous problems within the Corps as the key issue. (cultures,
communications, lack of knowledge, use of existing technology,
structure, organization, management, leadership, monitoring, control,
mistakes)
A few people do care and one very important group should care more:
- levees.org is trying to staying on the Corps case with continuing information and lobbying
- Under pressure from the public spearheaded the Citizensfor1GreaterNew Orleansby
Louisiana legislators voted to create a consolidated Levee Board made
up of professionals that ought to be able to keep an eye on the Corps
-
John Barry is writing another book. His first Rising Tide took the Corps to task for the 1927 flood.
- Douglas Brinkley already released his book The Great Deluge and roundly criticized everyone involved.
-
Some enterprising lawyers are trying to sue. You see, even though the
Corps is immune from lawsuits for their "flood control" efforts, the
MRGO was a "navigation" project. Other lawyers are pursuing other theories.
-
The Washington Post has their opinion that the Corps is a Congressional sweetheart as host of many a pork barrel project.
-
Congress has not investigated the Corps. They investigated the heck out
of the response and FEMA but failed to show more than cursory interest in the
Corps and its performance.
- When
the Senate passed the 2005 Water Resources bill (in July 2006) they
added an amendment that will require external peer review for Corps
Projects over $20 million. Its a start, but the Senate failed to create
an external agency to prioritize projects. This is important because
the Corps is perennially overtasked and a favorite pork parking lot. And even worse it ended up moot as the bill did NOT emerge from confrence so did not become law.
- Bob Bea, Raymond Seed, Ivor vanHeerden, and all the professionals
involved in investigating the levee failures are all active and
critical of the Corps.
|